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Container security
1. Container security
2. Cargo shortage claims - who's responsible?
3. Coffee contaminated by wood preservatives
4. Hydrogen sulphide alert
5. Weighbridge accuracy
6. Theft from containers
7. Fumigation (phosphine) explosions
8. Bunker problems caused by quality decline and
emissions compliance .
9. Ship operators still overlooking risks from hatch
covers
Container
security
The container security seal industry is constantly
striving to improve on the designs of seals in order
that they cannot be breached without leaving evidence
that the seal has been opened.
Signum Services Limited, is also the UK Government's
official agency entitled 'Security Seal Testing
Authority' for the testing of security seals.
The seals themselves, from manufacturers all over the
world, are sent to the Authority and are then
strenuously tested by an engineer to ensure that they
cannot be unsealed without leaving telltale signs of
interference. Having undergone these stringent tests,
only those that pass receive the approval of the UK
Customs and Excise, a qualification highly sought after
by manufacturers as a selling point; no other country in
the world requires seals to be tested in this way.
Consequently, over the years, the quality of seals has
risen with a far greater proportion being impregnable
without leaving signs of tampering.
The result is that thieves wanting to steal all or some
of the cargo from a sealed container and wishing to
leave the seal intact are resorting to other means to
open the doors.
If, on receipt of a container at the consignee's
premises, the cargo is missing but the original security
seal is in place and intact, there is a simple
explanation and the explanation is always simple - cargo
cannot magically disappear through the walls of a steel
container. If the seal is of good quality and is one
which cannot be opened without leaving evidence, and the
container bears no evidence of a hole having been cut in
its metal work then the only way entry has been gained
is by tampering with the door mechanism.
This is becoming a more frequent problem and usually
occurs in one of two ways: either by removing the handle
lock set complete, with the seal in place, from the
right hand container door by cutting off the rivets
which hold it on (upper photo), or by cutting off
the rivet which holds the handle in the locking bar
handle hub (lower photo).
Thieves who adopt either of these two methods can then
open the doors of the box and remove the cargo. The door
is then secured by replacing the missing rivets with
bolts, the original seal being undisturbed.
All this is possible because the entire door locking
mechanism and both parts of the seal bracket are fixed
to the door itself and no part of them to the body of
the container.
Cable and barrier or bar seals combat the problem by
being looped or hooked around the locking bars of both
doors. These seals of course cost extra money. However,
boxes are now being manufactured with one part of the
seal bracket being at the foot of the locking bar, on
the cam on the right hand door and the second part of
the bracket welded to the container itself on the bottom
of the box on the door sill.
The seal therefore, when in place, secures the locking
bar to the container itself. The result is that no
bolts, rivets or parts of the locking mechanism can be
removed enabling the container to be opened leaving the
seal intact. If the doors have been opened, the seal
must have been breached. As containers are renewed and
replaced over the years, they should be replaced with
those bearing the seal brackets at the bottom of the
locking bar and on the door sill.
Cargo shortage claims - who's responsible?
Requirement to state quantity of cargo in the bill
of lading
Under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules Article III Rule
3, the carrier must state the quantity of cargo in the
bill in accordance with the information provided in
writing by the shipper. The statement is prima facie
evidence that the ship received that quantity. Under the
Hague-Visby Rules the carrier is bound by this statement
of quantity where the bill has been transferred to a
third party.
Proviso under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules
However, there is a proviso at the end of Article III
Rule 3 that the carrier is not bound to state the
quantity of cargo where he has grounds for suspecting
that the shipper's figure is not accurate or he has no
way of checking it.
Reservations in the bill of lading
It
is common to see reservations made to the statement of
quantity in the bill, e.g. "Weight ... quantity ...
unknown". Under English Law this has been held to be
effective where the master has no means of knowing the
quantity shipped, so that other evidence will have to be
produced to prove any shortage (New Chinese Antimony
Company Ltd v Ocean Steamship Company Ltd [1917] 2 KB
644 approved in the 'MATA K' [1998] 2 LLR 614). There
are however many jurisdictions which will not give
effect to such reservations e.g. USA.
Knowledge that the shippers' figure is inaccurate
The master may not be able to rely on the reservation
where he knows the shippers' figure is inaccurate. The
safer course then is for the master to write the ship's
figures alongside the shippers' figures in the bill of
lading. Where the discrepancy is so great the bill of
lading figure is obviously wrong, it may not be safe
even under English Law to rely on the reservation (see
the 'SIRINA' [1988] 2 LLR 613 at 615).
Where the master is pressured to sign an
inaccurate bill of lading
Where physical threats or coercion are used, the
master may be forced to sign the bill of lading stating
an inaccurate quantity. Once the master reaches a place
of safety, he should consider issuing a protest.
Where the charterer relies on a clause stating that
bills must be signed by the master as presented, the
master is not required to sign bills which are factually
incorrect (see the 'BOUKADOURA' [1989] 1 LLR page 393).
If commercial pressure is applied by the shipper, the
owner may have to consider whether to try to negotiate,
accept the commercial risk of signing the incorrect
bills of lading or accept a letter of indemnity.
If
a letter of indemnity is issued where the bill of lading
figure is clearly wrong it will be unenforceable under
English Law on the grounds of fraudulent
misrepresentation. (Brown Jenkinson v Percy Dalton
[1957] 2QB 621, 639).
It is also dangerous to sign
bills of lading containing inaccurate information as P&I
Club cover may be lost.
The law in this area is complex and the consequences
serious. It is essential that the Member discuss the
position with his P&I Club and lawyers.
Owners' or charterers' bills of lading
If a party is identified on the front of the bill of
lading as the 'carrier' on whose behalf the bill has
been signed, this is likely under English Law to prevail
over printed clauses on the reverse e.g. a Himalaya
Clause (the House of Lords in the 'STARSIN' LMLN 611
overturning the Court of Appeal). (See 'case
updates').
Where it is a charterers' bill, owners may still be
sued in tort or bailment.
The NYPE Inter-Club Agreement (ICA)
Where there is an ICA clause in the charterparty,
owners are normally entitled to recover a 50%
contribution from charterers for shortage claims. If the
shortage was due to cargo handling and Clause 8 has not
been amended with "and responsibility", charterers'
contribution is increased to 100%.
Shortage resulting from stevedore pilferage or
negligence
If the stevedores are responsible for shortage, this
may operate as a defence to a cargo claim or the basis
of a recovery against charterers, depending on who is
contractually responsible for those stevedores.
Under the bill of lading:
If
the bill incorporates the charterparty terms under which
charterers are responsible for loading and discharge,
under English Law this arguably absolves owners from
responsibility for losses resulting from stevedore
operations, (see the 'CORAL' [1993] 1 LLR 1).
Under the charterparty:
Where charterers are responsible for loading, stowage
and discharge, owners may recover cargo shortage claims
from charterers on the basis of breach of contract.
Period of responsibility
Under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules the carrier's
responsibility ceases when the cargo is discharged over
the ship's rail. Any shortage after discharge should not
be the ship's responsibility (although in practice this
depends on having the appropriate evidence in a
jurisdiction which applies the Rules properly).
Evidence
Obviously, evidence is vital in trying to show that
there is no real shortage. The ship's draft survey,
tallies and independent surveys can prove invaluable.
However, the weight they are given depends on the
particular legal regime where the claim is brought.
Coffee
contaminated by wood preservatives
We
have been advised of an incident where the treatment of
container flooring resulted in a consignment of coffee
being contaminated.
Prior to loading the coffee into the containers, wood
preservative products containing dichlorophenol were
used for the treatment of the container's boarded wooden
floors. Dichlorophenol, a chemical used to produce the
herbicide 2.4D, is toxic and causes severe tainting in
most foodstuffs through its pervasive and long-lasting
odour. Articles detailing the effects of dichlorophenol
are available to Members on the Encyclopaedia on
www.epandi.com.
On delivery, the coffee was found to give off a bad
odour. Further analysis of the coffee showed that small
amounts of dichlorophenol were present. Due to this
contamination all the coffee carried in these containers
was condemned for human consumption, and with no other
alternative, the coffee was destroyed.
Considering the consequences of carrying foodstuffs
in containers previously treated with products
containing dichlorophenol, we advise all Members to
ensure that they try to obtain data on the history of
containers prior to their use. If practicable, separate
pools of containers designated for loading chemicals or
foodstuffs could be kept, so as to avoid claims such as
this in the future.
Hydrogen
sulphide alert
The Club has been made aware, from several sources, of
rising safety concerns in respect of high levels of H2S
in some crude oils. Bearing in mind the serious risk of
damage or fatality to crew and shore personnel we
reproduce below an alert notice issued by the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
"While the dangers relating to hydrogen sulphide (H2S)
are not new there is a growing body of evidence
suggesting that H2S levels in some crude oils
is on the increase. The reason for this apparent
increase is unclear.
H2S is known to be present in crude oil
exported from a number of countries including Iran,
Qatar, South America, Mexico, Poland, Latvia, Russia and
Turkey. Recently higher than normal amounts have been
detected in Brent crude and within the last few days
very significant amounts of H2S have been
found in the ullage spaces of two tankers loading fuel
oil cargo at Jubail in the Arabian Gulf.
Terminal operators should remain alert to the dangers
posed by the presence of H2S, either within
cargoes being delivered or remaining within the residues
from a previous cargo. The precautions and procedures
described within ISGOTT must be strictly adhered to.
"The advent of inert gas and closed loading systems has
largely negated the need to open tanks except for
non-routine purposes, although reducing tank pressures
to near zero for sampling is a relatively common
practice.
"Purging for cargo preparation is also common, thus the
planned release of the entire tank atmosphere,
particularly where unexpectedly high levels of H2S
are involved, poses a significant danger to individuals
in the immediate and, in some cases, the not so
immediate, area.
Some countries, particularly in Europe, have already
stipulated maximum H2S levels in tanks prior
to loading and some terminal operators, most recently
BP, have reduced their acceptable arrival levels from
10ppm to 5ppm.
"In view of the above, we believe that it is sensible to
encourage all crude vessels to monitor tank atmospheres
and to advise of H2S levels in order that
terminal operators may gauge the magnitude of what is
clearly a growing problem. In addition, it may be
prudent to encourage the monitoring of fuel oil vessels
from areas which historically are known to pose a
problem, such as, Jubail. Regarding measurement, please
be aware that while Draeger type tubes provide an
accurate indication of H2S levels regardless
of whether the tank atmosphere is inerted or not, H2S
readings taken with an electronic meter in an inerted
atmosphere do not.
"Readers are asked to take note of the above and to
advise operational staff, surveyors and other relevant
personnel accordingly."
The Club has also been advised that in some cases shore
installations have been turning away fuel oil stock with
H2S. It is believed these stocks could be
finding their way into the bunker stream thereby
affecting all Members not just tanker operators.
Most people know H2S by its rotten egg smell,
however crew should be reminded that it could be fatal
to rely on this method of detection as H2S
deadens the sense of smell very quickly. A more reliable
method of determining concentrations of H2S
is by the use of Draeger type tubes or by the use of
personal warning monitors.
Weighbridge accuracy
So you thought weighbridge figures were accurate? Recent
experiences in Dar Es Salaam might make you want to
think again. Receivers are notorious for ignoring draft
survey reports on the basis they are inaccurate the
following might make them want to re consider.
The photographs, above and below, highlight a novel way
of saving time on a weighbridge not long enough to take
a complete articulated unit.
We are advised that instead of uncoupling the trailer
the front end of the unit is weighed, the unit then
drives through leaving the rear axle on and another
reading taken. The readings are then added together.
This is done both empty and full the difference being
the weight of the commodity.
The Club strongly recommends that:
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Members be aware that port weighbridge figures
in Dar Es Salaam could be suspect.
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Members should contact the Club's
correspondent if outturn figures are to be based on
weighbridge calculations alone.
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Members should make charterers aware that
there could be a problem with outturn figures in
this port.
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As a general rule:
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Members should always make sure, if possible,
hatches are sealed prior to leaving the load
port in the presence of a third party surveyor.
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Invite charterers/receivers to attend at the
discharge port to witness the seal breaking.
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Always conduct an independent draft survey,
inviting charterers/receivers to attend.
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Closely monitor any spillage at time of
discharge, keeping photographic and written
evidence. If spillage is excessive contact the
Club's correspondent.
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If Members are faced with shortage claims based
on weighbridge figures it is essential for
weighbridge calibration records to be checked.
The actual method of use of the weighbridge
itself should also be checked for irregular
practices as above.
Theft from containers
During the past six months there have been three losses
of substantial amounts of computer related cargo from
containers that have been shipped from the USA and
discharged in Santos, Brazil. These three losses
totalled over US$1,000,000 in value.
The seals on the containers were checked immediately
before loading in the United States and checked again
immediately upon landing at Santos. In two cases, the
seals on landing were found to be different and in one
case no seal at all was present. In one case, later in
the day, a routine check by Brazilian Customs on empty
containers discharged from the same vessel found most of
the missing cargo from one of the boxes.
The Club's investigative unit, Signum Services Limited,
found that the cargo being shipped was carried in
cartons 205mm x 250mm x 485mm and that when the loaded
containers, all stowed below deck, were in their stowage
positions there existed a gap of between 250mm and 300mm
between the container doors, a steel walkway and safety
railings in the hold. This gap enabled the doors of the
container to be opened sufficiently for a man to enter
the container and the cartons of computer equipment
passed out through the open door.
Further investigations showed that in the case of the
two containers examined routinely by Customs these had
been stowed immediately adjacent to one of the
containers from which cargo had been stolen. In the
other two cases, empty containers had either been stowed
adjacent or nearby.
It was clear from all the enquiries that stevedores at
the port were obtaining details of containers stuffed
with this valuable cargo which were due to be discharged
and also the stowage positions of empty boxes which were
also scheduled to be landed at Santos.
During the twelve or more hours between the time that
the vessels came alongside and the boxes in question
were actually discharged, the stevedores were busy in
the holds below deck, out of view, stripping the
contents of full containers and putting them in empties
which could later be taken out of the terminal without
the stringent security measures applied to loaded boxes.
The vessels' agents have placed security guards onboard
whilst the vessel is in port but it will be difficult
for these guards to prevent this type of theft.
Signum have recommended that, if possible, 20-foot boxes
instead of the usual 40-foot be used to carry this cargo
and the containers stowed door to door, above deck on
tiers 86 and 88, in order that it is impossible to open
the doors. Even if 40-foot containers are used, these
too should be stowed on the third or fourth tier above
deck.
With the stevedores at this port now knowing that they
can open container doors up to 300mm whilst they are
stowed in the racks below deck and the fact that the
cargo is being stolen onboard before passing over the
ship's rail, it is important that empty containers are,
if possible, stowed above deck in higher tiers to
prevent other cargo which could be passed through this
relatively small gap being stolen.
Fumigation
(phosphine) explosions
We have been informed of an explosion that occurred
recently on a ship while at sea and under fumigation
with phosphine gas. Whilst no crewmember was injured as
a result of the explosion, a pair of hatchcover panels
was blown upwards, coming to rest against the
accommodation block. The cause of the explosion was
attributed to the ongoing fumigation of the cargo grain
that was being treated with phosphine gas generated from
aluminium phosphide tablets.
We understand that whilst not a regular occurrence, this
is not the first time this has occurred.
Phosphine gas has long been recognized as highly toxic.
However, it is not widely known that it is, potentially,
an inflammable gas, with a low flammability level of
1.8% by volume in air. In the event that a mixture of
air/phosphine - in which the phosphine concentration
exceeds its inflammable limit - is ignited in a confined
space, it is highly probable that an explosion will
occur.
Phosphine gas is generated from aluminium phosphide
tablets by reaction of the aluminium phosphide with
moisture in the air. This process, in addition to
liberating phosphine, also produces aluminium oxide as a
by-product. Additionally, small quantities of another
gas known as diphosphine are also sometimes produced
during this reaction. Unlike phosphine, diphosphine is
spontaneously inflammable, reacting instantly with
oxygen in the air.
Production of diphosphine occurs in a similar way to
that generating phosphine i.e. by reaction between
aluminium phosphide and moisture, but in this case the
aluminium phosphide tablets contained an imbalance
between the aluminium and phosphorous, with an excess of
phosphorous compared to aluminium. Such a situation may
arise during production of the tablets if an excess of
phosphorous is inadvertently used during preparation.
Although not proven definitively, we have been advised
that it is likely that potentially explosive mixtures of
air and phosphine are frequently encountered during the
first 12 to 24 hours of phosphine fumigations when the
phosphine concentration in the upper areas of the hold
reaches a peak concentration. The resulting high
concentrations of phosphine then disperse by diffusion,
with the gas diffusing into the less accessible lower
portions of the cargo. In this recent case, the
explosion occurred some 12 hours or more after the
fumigation had been started and the hatchcovers had been
closed. Although no source of ignition was identified
conclusively, it is suspected that defective aluminium
phosphide tablet(s), containing localised excesses of
phosphorous were the cause. Such tablets could be
envisaged as producing localised high concentrations of
diphosphine leading to a very rapid reaction with oxygen
and to ignition.
Aluminium phosphide tablets are routinely used in
fumigation and a very large number of shipments are
fumigated annually without any problems. Incidences of
explosions are therefore very rare and, as far as we
have been advised, fumigant explosions have only been
encountered when companies have used cheaper brands of
aluminium phosphide tablets produced in developing
countries.
We would advise Members that when cargoes are fumigated
in ports in the developing world that the presence of
crewmembers on deck adjacent to or in the vicinity of
the holds and hatchcovers under fumigation is kept to a
minimum during the first 24 to 48 hours after the
fumigation has been set.
Source :
UK P & I Club ( from Oct. 2002 – Sept.2003 )
Bunker problems caused by quality decline and emissions
compliance by North of England P & I Club on 30 Jul
2005
Shipowners face a general decline in worldwide bunker
quality and potential problems complying with the new
sulphur oxide (SOx) emission limits required by annex VI
of the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), according to North
of England P&I club.
Mike Salthouse, a director of the 54 million GT club's
FD&D department, says North of England has experienced a
steady increase in the number of claims and enquiries
relating to bunker quality during the past year.
'There is widespread concern about the general decline
in bunker quality at many ports,' he says. 'Getting the
right fuel at the right price will be a major challenge
for vessel operators seeking to comply with the new
emission standards.'
Annex VI came into force on 19 May 2005 and, by the end
of June, had been ratified by 25 countries representing
63% of world tonnage. It imposes a global cap of 4.5%
sulphur content in bunkers and will impose a much more
stringent limit of 1.5% in designated SOx emission
control areas or 'SECAs'. The first of these – the
Baltic – comes into existence on 19 May 2006 and the
North Sea and English Channel SECA starts in autumn
2007.
'We anticipate problems with availability of the low-sulphur
fuel required in the first SECA, both in quantity and
geographically, and there is also likely to be a
significant cost premium,' says Tony Baker, manager of
North of England's risk-management department.
The club is thus advising members to plan well ahead to
obtain suitable bunkers. In a special supplement to the
60th issue of its loss-prevention newsletter Signals,
North of England has also spelt out the precautions
shipowners need to take when stemming bunkers –
particularly the importance of obtaining a
representative sample.
'All samples should be sealed and signed by the supplier
and the ship's officer in charge of bunkering
operations,' says Baker. 'Shipowners also need to ensure
they obtain properly completed bunker delivery notes,
which should include a signed declaration by the
supplier that the sulphur content is less than 4.5% or
1.5% as required and that the fuel is within the
specification defined in MARPOL annex VI regulation 18.'
Other issues covered in the supplement include
compliance certification, record keeping, managing dual
pipe and tank systems, blending with marine diesel,
exhaust-scrubbing technology, charterparty issues and EU
proposals to reduce sulphur limits further in European
ports in 2010.
Ship operators still overlooking risks from hatch covers by North of England P & I Club on 22 Jan 2005
The level of losses suffered by the shipping industry
due to defective or poorly maintained hatch covers shows
no signs of diminishing, according to a leading P&I
club.
In the latest issue of its loss prevention newsletter
Signals, the 50 million GT, A- rated North of England
P&I club says by way of example that it continues to
experience three to four claims each year valued between
US$ 500,000 and US$ 1,000,000 for water-damaged cargoes
resulting from hatch-cover defects.
'The irony is that the cost of preventing these losses
can usually be measured in a few thousand dollars or
less,' says Tony Baker, head of the club's
risk-management department. 'Often all that is necessary
is the replacement of some defective rubber seals, some
minor repairs to steelwork or sometimes just cleaning
down a coaming.'
Baker says most problems are experienced on older and
smaller ships. 'However, larger and newer ships are not
exempt from hatch-cover problems and often give rise to
the largest individual claims. No-one is immune.'
North of England is reminding its members of the
importance of regularly testing hatch covers for
weathertightness, using either a traditional hose test
or ultrasonic leak detection. Though the latter requires
specialist equipment and trained personnel, it is more
accurate and avoids the risk of damaging any cargo in
the holds.
The top five hatch cover defects identified by North of
England are: seal rubber permanent set beyond the point
of replacement; seal rubber worn, torn, displaced or
missing; temporary seal fixes; wastage of steel support
pads or coaming side plates; and blocked drain holes in
hatch covers and coaming corners.
According to Baker: 'All hatch-cover seals should be
replaced when the permanent set reaches half the design
compression or if any part of the seal is damaged. The
use of proprietary sealing tape or high-expansion foam
may be acceptable as an additional precaution on a
well-maintained hatch cover, but is not acceptable as an
alternative to proper permanent repairs.' |
